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Walter Adams*
James W. Brock**
The Proposed Emasculation of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act
The Reagan Administration's recent legislative proposals for anti-
trust reform would, if enacted by Congress, mark an historic reversal
of the nation's anti-merger policy. They would significantly relax ex-
tant statutory prohibitions against potentially anticompetitive merg-
ers and acquisitions. They also would empower the President to grant
relief to import-impacted industries by "temporarily" exempting them
from the anti-merger laws. The Administration's rationale seems to
be that past merger policies are responsible for the declining interna-
tional competitiveness of American firms, and that those policies have
deprived American industries of the ability to restructure themselves
in order to achieve (or regain) world-class competitive status.
POSTULATES UNDERLYING THE "MODERNIZED" SECTION 7
OF THE CLAYTON ACT
Unfortunately, these proposed revisions are based on six postulates
which are asserted with axiomatic confidence, but which lack empiri-
cal support.
First, the Administration believes that overzealous anti-merger en-
forcement has prevented American companies from engaging in merg-
ers and acquisitions. This is incongruent with the facts: Megamerger
mania has engulfed American industry since the 1970s. Between 1970
and 1984, some 44,200 mergers and acquisitions were consummated in
the United States. In 1984 alone, mergers and acquisitions totalled
2,543. The total value of all U.S. acquisitions reached an all-time rec-
ord high of $82.6 billion in 1981, and established new records of $122.2
billion in 1984, and $179.6 billion in 1985.1 The very largest corpora-
tions in the country have been in the forefront of the merger wave,
not only acquiring "small" and "medium-sized" companies, but-in-
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1. W.T. Grimm & Co., MERGERSTAT REV. 1984, at 6; Vartan, New Climate for Merg-
ers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1986, at D10, col. 2.
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creasingly-combining with one another (including such recent con-
solidations as DuPont/Conoco; U.S. Steel/Marathon Oil; Chevron!
Gulf; Texaco/Getty Oil; Allied/Bendix/Signal; Standard Brands/
Nabisco/R.J. Reynolds; General Electric/RCA; Occidental Petroleum/
Iowa Beef Processors/Cities Service/Midcon; General Motors/EDS/
Hughes).
Moreover, a myriad of quasi-consolidations, or "joint ventures,"
have been countenanced, notably between the American auto oligop-
oly and its foreign rivals (e.g., GM/Toyota; GM/Daewoo; GM/Isuzu;
GM/Suzuki; GM/Lotus; Ford/Mazda; Ford/Mazda/Kia; Chrysler/Mit-
subishi; Chrysler/Mitsubishi/Hyundai; Chrysler/Samsung; and
Chrysler/Maserati). Indeed, according to one count, the Justice De-
partment has challenged but 26 of the approximately 10,000 merger
applications filed with it during the 1980s. 2 At the same time, Justice
has since 1981 sanctioned 75 of the 100 largest mergers in American
history-hardly a record of "burdensome" or "overzealous" antitrust
enforcement. 3
Second, the Reagan Administration uncritically accepts the "new
learning" that megamergers are the touchstone for enhanced produc-
tion efficiency, technological innovation, and world-class competitive-
ness. Yet, objective empirical research casts considerable doubt on
this currently fashionable belief. In one exhaustive study of the statis-
tical evidence regarding conglomerate mergers, Dennis C. Mueller re-
ports "a surprisingly consistent picture. Whatever the stated or
unstated goals of managers are, the [conglomerate] mergers they have
consummated have on average ... not resulted in increased economic
efficiency."4 Mueller reports similar findings in an updated
econometric study expanded to include all varieties of mergers- hori-
zontal and vertical, as well as conglomerate.5 Other careful research-
ers reach similar conclusions.6 Moreover, the high post-merger
2. Solomon, Administration Hopes to Extend the Reagan Revolution to Antitrust
Laws, NAT'L J., Jan. 18, 1986, at 144.
3. W.T. Grimm & Co., supra note 1, at 24-28. For a detailed analysis of large corpo-
rate acquisitions, see W. MUELLER, THE CELLER-KEFAUVER ACT: THE FIRST 27
YEARS, Study for the House Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1980). On the anticompetitive problems posed by joint ventures,
see Adams & Brock, The "New Learning" and the Euthanasia of Antitrust, 74
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 1986).
4. Mueller, The Effects of Conglomerate Mergers: A Survey of the Empirical Evi-
dence, 1 J. BANKING & FIN. 344 (1977) (emphasis added).
5. Mueller, Mergers and Market Share, 67 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 259 (1985).
6. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORM-
ANCE 138-41 (2nd ed. 1980); Scherer, Takeovers: Present and Future Dangers,
BROOKINGS REV., Winter/Spring 1986, at 15-20; S. RHOADES, POWER, EMPIRE
BUILDING, AND MERGERS, esp. 89-118 (1983). For a compendium of studies on the
failure of mergers to enhance economic performance, see Adams & Brock, supra
note 3.
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divorce rate-up to forty percent of the 1970's acquisitions, according
to W.T. Grimm and Co.-is further evidence that the efficiency-
through-merger hypothesis is a dubious basis for formulating public
policy.
Nor do megamergers seem conducive to technological innovation.
According to one analyst, the "vast majority of acquisitions of high-
technology companies by large corporations [including acquisitions by
Exxon, Buroughs, 3M, and Westinghouse] have ended in disaster."7
An important reason, The Wall Street Journal reports, is that the "gi-
ants' many layers of bureaucracy often paralyze the freewheeling en-
trepreneurial style typical in the high-tech world."8  Conversely,
managers of divested operations released from control by corporate
giants are "freed from endless hours of explaining proposals to corpo-
rate headquarters and waiting months, often years, for approvals on
new projects .... -9 Although the Administration seems incognizant
of this reality, a spate of recent articles in prominent business periodi-
cals has documented the creative backwardness of Bigness.lo As Mar-
tin S. Davis, president of Gulf & Western, recently confided to
Business Week: "Bigness is not a sign of strength. In fact, just the
opposite is true."11
Third, the Reagan Administration believes that exempting import-
impacted U.S. industries from the antitrust laws, and permitting them
to freely merge, will cure the malaise of such industries as steel and
autos, and bolster their ability to compete against imports. This asser-
tion is flawed, not only because (as has just been argued) megamergers
seldom contribute to improved economic performance. Beyond this, it
ignores the fact that the import "problem" suffered by many major
American industries is typically the result of oligopoloid giantism and
noncompetitive industry structures at home-industry structures that
have bred cost inefficiency, poor productivity, lethargic innovation,
and, most generally, the bureaucratic dry-rot of unchallenged oligop-
oly power.1 2 Indeed, if mammoth size and especially merger-induced
giantism were truly conducive to world-class competitiveness, the
7. Cohen, Failed Marriages, Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
8. 1d.
9. Wayne, Joys of Fleeing the Corporate Stable, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1981, § 3, at 1,
col. 4 & 26, col. 1.
10. See, e.g., Big Goes Bust, ECONOIST, Apr. 17, 1982, at 67; Small is Beautiful Now
in Manufacturing, Bus. WK., Oct. 22, 1984, at 152; Prokesch & Powell, Do Merg-
ers Really Work? Not Very Often-Which Raises Questions About Merger
Mania, Bus. WK., June 3, 1985, at 88; Pittel, Smaller Can Be Prettier, FORBES,
June 17, 1985, at 206.
11. Dobrzynski, Splitting Up: The Other Side of Merger Mania, Bus. WK., July 1,
1985, at 50, 53.
12. See W. ADAMs & J. BROCK, THE BIGNFss COMPLEX (forthcoming from Pantheon
Books 1986).
1986]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
American steel and automobile oligopolies should be the efficiency
and innovation marvels of the world. Clearly, they are not.
General Motors is the world's largest auto company. Its dollar
sales are roughly equivalent to the combined sales of nine Japanese
auto makers. The sales of GM and Ford equal the combined sales of
twelve leading foreign auto companies-the three largest in Japan,
Germany, France, and Great Britain, respectively. Even Chrysler is
bigger than all but two of the Japanese producers. Can it really be
argued that the U.S.A.'s Big Three are too small to be efficient, or that
massive mergers and joint ventures are imperative to make them com-
petitive in world markets? Certainly, if bigness were truly the guar-
antor of efficiency, GM would not find it necessary to enter into joint
ventures with foreign companies (e.g., Toyota, Daewoo, et. al.) in order
to learn how to produce cars economically.
As for steel, it is clear that firm size (as distinct from plant size) is
not the problem of our major integrated producers. They dwarf not
only many of their foreign competitors, but also the domestic
minimills that have captured increasing shares of the U.S. market. It
is equally clear that merger-induced giantism, consummated over
three quarters of a century,1 3 has not infused the steel oligopoly with
an elan vital. Merging two major steel companies saddled with anti-
quated, inefficient facilities-LTV and Youngstown in the mid-1970s,
and LTV and Republic in the mid-1980s-does not solve the efficiency
problem. Combining two losers does not make a winner. If the objec-
tive is to become competitive in world markets-to compete success-
13. The merger and acquisition record in American steel is instructive, especially in
the light of the industry's less than stellar performance in recent decades. The
formation of the steel oligopoly dates back to the founding of U.S. Steel in 1901-
the "consolidation of consolidations" which combined 180 formerly independent
plants and which captured control of 65% of the American steel industry. Bethle-
hem Steel was incorporated in 1904 as a combination of 10 producers; subse-
quently, between 1916 and 1945, it acquired 33 other firms. Other members of the
oligopoly fraternity also grew largely by merger and acquisition. See FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, THE MERGER MOVEMENT, A SUMMARY REPORT, app. 1 (1948);
Steel-Acquisitions, Mergers, and Expansion of 12 Major Companies, 1900-1950,
Hearings Before House Select Comm. on Small Business, 81st Cong., 2d sess.,
1950.
The urge to merge among the steel giants has continued- uninterrupted-to
the present day. In 1968, Wheeling Steel (the industry's 10th largest) merged
with Pittsburgh Steel (the 16th largest). In 1971, National Steel (4th largest) ac-
quired Granite City Steel (13th largest). In 1978, Jones & Laughlin (the 7th larg-
est) was merged with Youngstown Sheet & Tube (the 8th largest). And, in 1983,
LTV (owner of the combined Youngstown and Jones & Laughlin operations) ac-
quired Republic Steel, thereby rendering LTV the 2nd largest producer in the
industry.
Clearly, antitrust has not interfered with this restructuring of the industry via
merger. Equally clearly, this restructuring has done little, if anything, to cure the
industry's chronic malaise.
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fully against Japan-what is needed are new, modern, state-of-the-art
plants that are cost-effective. Mergers are not the means to that end.
Indeed, it is notable that in the one instance when antitrust action
blocked a major merger-United States v. Bethlehem Steel3--the per-
formance effects were singularly positive. Bethlehem proceeded to do
what it had persistently pleaded was unfeasible: it constructed a giant,
state-of-the-art facility at Burns Harbor, Indiana-"the only inte-
grated green-field blast furnace oxygen converter rolling mill complex
built during the 1960s and 1970s to provide a U.S. counterpart to the
modern steel-making capacity growing by leaps and bounds abroad."'5
In sum, a dispassionate review of steel history from 1901 to the present
yields at least three incontrovertible conclusions: a permissive merger
policy promotes neither efficiency nor technological innovativeness;
progressive consolidation of already overconcentrated industries may
only exacerbate oligopolistic behavior and, therefore, invite a perpetu-
ation of delinquent performance; and antitrust action against mergers
in these industries often promotes, rather than diminishes, the pros-
pects for enhanced economic performance and international
competitiveness.
Fourth, the Reagan Administration posits that foreign competition
renders domestic industry structure irrelevant, and obviates the
anticompetitive consequences of mergers in import-sensitive indus-
tries. But this postulate, too, is erroneous. It ignores the well-docu-
mented reality that giant international rivals recognize that their
mutual self-interest lies in cooperation and collusion, not hard compe-
tition; and, further, that concentration of domestic industries en-
hances the fruits, means, and incentives for forging global market
control. As Sir Alfred Mond, organizer of ICI, the giant British chemi-
cal combine, pointed out long ago, "You cannot discuss big problems of
industry with other countries until your own industries are organized
first."16 Or, as Corwin D. Edwards has explained: "Unless domestic
business enterprises effectively control the market in each coun-
try... international [market control] becomes impossible because of
the certainty of local competition sufficient to nullify cartel poli-
cies." 17 Viewed in this light, domestic consolidation may not portend
more vigorous international rivalry (as the Administration presumes).
Instead, it may well mark an important first step toward transnational
oligopolization, a concomitant diminution of competition, and a return
to the global market controls-cartels, joint ventures, transnational
14. 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
15. F. SCHERER, supra note 6, at 546.
16. Quoted in C. EDWARDs, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
CARTELS, Study for Senate Subcomm. on War Mobilization, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1946).
17. Id at 1-2.
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mergers, and mutually agreed upon spheres of influence-of the inter-
war years.1 8
Fifth, the Administration bases its proposals on the belief that the
only anti-social problem posed by mergers is a capacity on the part of
the merged firms to affect price in some "relevant" market. Absent
such influence, Administration policy-makers seem to believe, merg-
ers and acquisitions are unobjectionable, regardless of how large the
combining firms may be. In reality, however, this is a profoundly na-
ive conception of the politico-economic consequences of Bigness and
power. The Bigness Complex in autos illustrates the point: When
Chrysler (then the nation's tenth largest industrial concern) con-
fronted bankruptcy in 1978-79 as the result of poor performance, it did
not passively submit to the rules of the competitive market game. In-
stead, the firm-joined by the United Auto Workers, as well as by sup-
pliers, subcontractors, governors and mayors, senators and
representatives, Republicans and Democrats-mobilized the power of
giantism to manipulate the state and obtain a federal bailout. In 1981,
when the entire domestic oligopoly confronted the competition of Jap-
anese imports (after having ignored the market for decades), the Big-
18. The vast, extensively-documented network of global market controls erected dur-
ing the decades preceding World War II belies the Administration's faith in the
immutability of international competition.
In chemicals, for example, the world's largest producers, capped by the
"Grand Alliance" between DuPont in the U.S., Imperial Chemical Industries
(ICI) in Great Britain, and IG Farben in Germany, "set up their private controls.
They divided markets; they marked off industrial fields; they established export
quotas; they exploited specified fields and markets cooperatively. Joint control of
the market became the general rule; free competition, the exception." G. STOCK-
ING & M. WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION 418 (1946). According to Stocking and
Watkins' classic study, global chemical cartel controls embraced far more than a
seemingly inexhaustible number of particular products. More broadly, they en-
compassed "a whole series of tangible and intangible [intercompany] relation-
ships, nebulous and specific arrangements, amorphous and settled conventions ...
which have had a real and potent influence in shaping the development of the
world's chemical industries and in regulating chemical markets ...... I- at 419.
"By informal understandings, international alliances, communities of financial
interest, joint enterprises and 'patents and processes' agreements, all woven into
a coherent pattern, they ... established 'orderly' markets for chemicals, abated
competitive risks, and maintained a high rate of profits." Id- at 11. For these
chemical giants, the outbreak of war was a temporary disruption; their "general
understanding was that they would take up again at the close of the war where
they had left off, in an atmosphere of mutual concord and cooperation." Id- at
423.
The chemical industry was not unique in this regard, however. Global cartel
agreements between the world's leading producers controlled international trade
in a large number of fields, including petroleum, steel, aluminum, light bulbs, and
magnesium. Indeed, at the outbreak of World War II, a Justice Department
study found 179 world cartels to be in operation, with American companies par-
ticipating in 109 of them. See Adams & Brock, supra note 3 and sources cited
therein.
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ness Complex in autos-companies and the Union-engineered a
bailout of the whole industry from global competition through govern-
mentally-negotiated "voluntary" Japanese export restraints. In 1985,
GM and Ford seized upon the power of size, and obtained a relaxation
of government fuel economy standards, by threatening economic sabo-
tage on a grand scale-plant closings, shutdowns, layoffs and unem-
ployment-should their demands be denied. Alas, Brobdingnagian
size permits privileged firms and industries to demand-and, more
often than not, to obtain-tax favors, dispensations, governmentally-
subsidized loans, governmentally-subsidized services, and tax holidays
from states and communities across the country. In a representative
democracy, the power of giantism is not limited solely to the ability to
influence price in an isolated "relevant" market; it encompasses the
far more ominous capacity to manipulate the state to anti-social ends.
Not the least threatening of these are government protection from
foreign competition and federal bailouts-outcomes which the Admin-
istration purportedly seeks to avoid, but which merger-induced giant-
ism renders more feasible and more difficult to resist.19
Sixth, Administration policymakers assume that, at worst, mergers
are merely benign. After all, they seem to reason, if a merger fails to
produce better economic performance, the combination will be un-
done, the acquired operations divested, and society will be none the
worse for it. However, this ignores the key economic principle of "op-
portunity cost" and its most important corollary, that there is no such
thing as a free lunch (a proverbial truth that this Administration
should be expected to embrace). Thus, two decades of managerial en-
ergies devoted to sterile paper entrepreneurialism and the quick-
growth-through-merger game are, at the same time, two decades dur-
ing which management attention has been diverted from the critical
task of investing in new plants, new products, and state-of-the-art
manufacturing techniques. Billions of dollars spent on shuffling own-
ership shares are, at the same time, billions of dollars not spent on
productivity-enhancing plant, equipment, and research and develop-
ment. The millions of dollars absorbed in legal fees and investment
banking commissions are, at the same time, millions of dollars not
plowed directly into the nation's industrial base. The opportunity
costs of merger mania are real. And they bode ill for the reindustrial-
ization of America.20
19. For an elaboration of the broader political econonic problems posed by Bigness
and corporate giantism, see Adams & Brock, Corporate Power and Economic Sab-
otage, 20 J. ECON. IssuEs - (forthcoming 1986) and Adams & Brock, Bigness and
Social EfWiciency: A Case Study of the U.S. Auto Industry, in CORPORATIONS AND
SOCIETY: POWER AND REsPONSIBIaTY (W. Samuels & A. Miller, eds.) (forthcom-
ing from Greenwood Press 1987).
20. The following 1983 expenditures reveal the current priorities of U.S. corporations
and the concomitant "opportunity cost" burden to the nation:
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THE LANGUAGE OF THE "MODERNIZED" SECTION 7
Aside from the infirmity of the postulates on which it is based, the
Merger Modernization Act of 1986 is a thinly veiled attempt at out-
right repeal of Section 7. The Act would replace the prohibition of
mergers where "the effect... may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion, or to tend to create a monopoly"2 1 with a prohibition of only
those mergers where "there is a significant probability" that a merger
"will increase the ability to exercise market power."22 It defines mar-
ket power as "the ability of one or more firms profitably to maintain
prices above competitive levels for a significant period of time."23
Stripped of persiflage, this change in the law's language raises the
threshold for illegal mergers from a "lessening of competition" to a
"creation of monopoly" standard. It would, in effect, permit all merg-
ers except those unlawful under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The
Act would, therefore, emasculate the existing Section 7 which was
specifically designed to strike at merger-induced accumulations of
power in their incipiency-i.e., before they reached monopoly propor-
tions. It would repeal the rule, articulated by Chief Justice Warren in
Brown Shoe, that Sherman Act (i.e. monopoly) standards were not to
be used in judging the legality of mergers under the Clayton Act.24 It
would transform the anti-merger law into an anti-monopoly law.
Lest this new monopoly statute be enforced with undue stringency,
the Act also instructs the courts to "duly consider all economic factors
relevant to the effect of the acquisition in the affected markets."25 A
Mergers & acquisitions: $122 billion
Net private domestic investment (nonresidential): 107 billion
Privately-financed corporate research &
development: 49 billion
Sources: ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, 250 (1985); DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 574 (1985); W.T. Grimm & Co.,
supra note 1, at 6.
Obviously, the expenditures on mergers and acquisitions are exceeding both the
investment in new plant and equipment, and dwarfing-by a margin of 2.5 to 1-
the funds devoted to research and development.
Nor are "tax incentives" a likely remedy for this imbalance. As the Citizens
for Tax Justice found, "companies that paid no tax between 1981 and 1984 cut
investment by four percent, cut employment by six percent, and cut exports by 15
percent-even as they embarked on a spree of mergers and higher dividend
payouts and raised their top executive salaries by 52 percent." McIntyre, Get on
Board, NEW REPUBLIC, June 2, 1986, at 14, 16.
21. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (emphasis added).
22. S. 2160, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 744, Part
II, Feb. 24, 1986, at 8 (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Senate Merger Bill].
The bill has been introduced in Congress as the Merger Modernization Act of
1986.
23. Id.
24. Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 328-29 (1962).
25. Senate Merger Bill, supra note 22, at 9.
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cynic might observe that the specifically enumerated factors plus the
catch-all "any other evidence" category constitute convenient loop-
holes which, if interpreted in the light of the "new learning" (Chicago
School) economics, would permit most megamergers to survive anti-
trust scrutiny. As Michael D. Pertschuk, former Chairman of the
Federal Trade Commission, points out, the likely result would be the
euthanasia of Section 7.
When we are faced with a proposed merger between the third- and fourth-
ranking companies in a major industry, ["new learning" economists would]
perceive this merger to be a competitive goad to Nos. 1 and 2. If America's
giants, Nos. 1 and 2 in an industry, prepare to join hands, [the economists
would perceive] that the relevant geographic market is not the United States,
but the world. Should the No. I and No. 2 breakfast cereal manufacturers in
the world become betrothed, [they would] decide that the relevant market is
far more commodious than had been thought: egg breeders, croissant bakers,
Egg McMuffin vendors, lox and cream cheese purveyors-all [would be]
shepherded into one great breakfast market in which the cereal giants will be
seen to occupy only modest market shares. Even monopoly need not concern
us, they [would] say, unless there exist great "barriers to entry" to potential
deconcentrators. But the only barrier to entry that ever seems to disturb our
economists is a government grant of monopoly-in which case no merger issue
arises. Thus the anticompetitive merger remains a receding mirage, never to
be encountered in real life.2 6
This outcome is not entirely speculative. As the Administration's
"analysis" and the legislative history of the Merger Modernization Act
indicate, the clear intent of the new law is not only to codify the 1984
Merger Guidelines, but also to assure that the "new learning" econom-
ics be enshrined as the official standard for interpreting the purpose
and the substance of our antitrust laws.
AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
If enhanced efficiency, technological progressiveness, and greater
competitiveness in world markets are to be made a national priority,
we would propose a quite different revision of Section 7. We would
suggest an outright prohibition of all corporate mergers involving cor-
porations with assets of more than one billion dollars, unless the ac-
quiring corporation could affirmatively demonstrate-say, before an
expert tribunal like the Federal Trade Commission-that the pro-
posed merger would not be likely to lessen competition in any line of
commerce; that it would enhance operating efficiency and contribute
substantially to the firm's international competitiveness; and that it
would promote technological progress in demonstrably specific ways.
Such legislation would, of course, permit any firms, regardless of size,
to grow by internal expansion-i.e., by building rather than buying. It
would even permit growth by acquisition, but only on the basis of
26. Pertschuk, Love That Market, NEW REPuBuc, May 14 1984, at 10, 11.
1986)
822 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:813
proven social advantage rather than on the basis of public relations
claims and media hype. Its most positive benefit would be to refocus
management's attention on creative entrepreneurship and away from
counterproductive financial shell games.
